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Determination of Federal Jurisdictional Amount
in Suits on Unliquidated Claims
Hoping to keep federal court dockets free of petty claims and
thereby to reduce the delay in bringing to trial controversies involving more substantial sums, Congress has given United States
district courts jurisdiction of many civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States and most disputes
between parties of diverse citizenship only when the alleged right
forming the basis of a claimant's cause of action can be valued at
more than ten thousand dollars.1 The value of a particular claim is
determined by reference to those portions of its proponent's plead-

. I. 28 U.S.C. §§ 188l(a), 1332(a) (1964). These provisions refer to the value of the
claimant's right as "the amount in controversy." For a discussion of the application of
this legislation in special situations, see IA BARRON 8c HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE 8e
PROCEDURE § 392 (Rules ed. 1960) (counterclaims and crossclaims); 2 id. §§ 508, 534, 569
(1961) Goinder of claims and parties).
Federal law provides different jurisdictional provisions for particular classes of cases
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1333-40, 1343-45, 1346(b), 1347-48, 1350-51, 1353-58 (1964). At present the largest cate•
gories of suits governed by § 1331(a) are actions arising under the Jones Act and suits
challenging the constitutionality of state legislation. See S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong,,
2d Sess. 5 (1958). The jurisdictional minimum in an interpleader action brought in a
federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship is $500. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964),
"The jurisdictional amount should not be so high as to convert the Federal courts
into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter a,vay their time in the trial of petty
controversies." S. REP. No. 1880, op. cit. supra, at 3.
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ing which tend to support his prayer for relief.2 Ne~ther the existence of a valid defense to the claim, even if it is obvious from the
face of the proponent's own pleading, nor an ultimate recovery of
less than ten thousand dollars has any significance in testing a court's
jurisdiction.3
When an opponent or the court sua sponte questions the
validity of a' claimant's assertion that the right which he seeks to
enforce has a value exceeding ten thousand dollars, the claimant
must establish the truth of his assertion.4 The statements in his
pleading are not necessarily helpful, for they satisfy the specificity
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if they merely
allege facts sufficient to indicate the general nature of the events
supposedly giving rise to a right of recovery. 5 Moreover, the assertion
of the presence of the jurisdictional amount itself need be nothing
more than a sentence to the effect that the amount in controversy
exceeds ten thousand dollars. 6 Nevertheless, it is generally assumed,
on the basis of the rule enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,1 that a
claimant's allegation of the presence of the jurisdictional amount
should be conclusive unless (I) it appears not to have been made in
good faith or (2) the court believes as a matter of legal certainty that
the value of the right in controversy is in fact ten thousand dollars
or less.
2. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938). See
generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 33 (1963).
3. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., supra note 2, at 289. See generally
1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 0.92[1] (2d ed. 1964); WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.
But see Unique Balance Co. v. De Vri_es, 166 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
4. See Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1959); Kantor v. Comet Press Books
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 321, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b), (h)(2); WRIGHT, op.
cit. supra note 2, § 33.
The court has discretion in determining the mode of proof. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307
U.S. 66, 71-72 (1939); Wade v. Rogala, supra, at 285; Kantor v. Comet Press Books Corp.,
supra, at 322; I MooRE, op. cit. supra note 3, ,r 0.92[4].
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) provides that jurisdictional issues "shall be .•. determined
before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the •.• determination thereof be deferred until the trial.''
5. "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, shall contain ••• (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ...." FED. R. Crv. P.
8(a)(2). See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 3,
,r 8.03. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(g) provides: "Where items of special damage are claimed, they
shall be specifically stated.'' This rule is designed to prevent an adversary from being
surprised at the nature of the injuries for which relief is sought. Therefore, only a
general statement of the types of injuries allegedly sustained is necessary to satisfy the
requirements of the rule. Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Brown, 307 F.2d 306, 308 (5th Cir.
1962); 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 3, ,r 9.08. Indeed, no greater factual detail is
required in pleading special damages than in pleading ordinary damages. See Fm. R.
CIV. P. Form 9.
·
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 2.
7. 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938).
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There may be relatively little difficulty in determining whether
claims for liquidated damages-fixed amounts or amounts that can be
fixed with a few simple calculations8-meet the jurisdictional requirement as interpreted in the light of the St. Paul doctrine. This could
be true, for example, when suit is brought to recover lost salary or
the proceeds of an insurance policy.9 Comparatively easy disposition
can likewise be made of those types of claims which are considered
incapable of pecuniary valuation and therefore not justiciable in a
federal court when jurisdiction is predicated solely upon a statute
containing a minimum amount-in-controversy provision.10 Evaluating a cause of action becomes more troublesome, however, when
its proponent demands unliquidated damages,11 such as compensation for pain and suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience, or
humiliation, or when he requests punitive damages and the applicable substantive law does not clearly prohibit their recovery. 12
When confronted with such unliquidated or punitive damage
claims, some courts stress the "good faith" aspect of the St. Paul
rule. It is apparently the absence of clear guidelines for establishing
\

8. "Liquidated damages 'mean damages, agreed upon as to amount by the parties,
or fixed by operation of law, or under the correct applicable principles of law made
certain in amount by the terms of the contract, or susceptible of being made certain in
amount by mathematical calculations from factors which are or ought to be in the
possession or knowledge of the party to be charged.'" Nonvood Morris Plan Co. V,
McCarthy, 295 Mass. 597, 602, 4 N.E.2d 450, 454 (1936), quoting from Cochrane v.
Forbes, 267 Mass. 417, 420, 166 N.E. 752, 753 (1929).
9. Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. California E. Ainvays, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 521 (N.D.
Cal. 1954) (where only damages sought are for lost earnings stemming from employee's
wrongful discharge, amount in controversy equals amount of former salary lost minus
amount of compensation received from an employer other than defendant since discharge); Nikora v. Mayer, 122 F. Supp. 587 (D. Conn. 1954) (in suit for specific performance of land contract, value of real property which is subject matter of contract is
amount in controversy); New Century Cas. Co. v. Chase, 39 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.W. Va.
1941) (in suit on insurance policy, maximum liability on policy is amount in controversy).
10. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885) (habeas corpus proceeding): Davenport v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1957) (suit to compel specific performance of an arbitration contract); United States ex rel. Curtiss v. Haviland, 297 Fed.
431 (2d Cir. 1924) (lunacy inquisition); McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md.
1951) (suit to prohibit divulgence of contents of intercepted telephone message): Whitney v. American Shipbuilding Co., 197 Fed. 777 (N.D. Ohio 1911) (stockholder's action
to compel a corporation to allow him to inspect its books and records): Bowman v.
Bowman, 30 Fed. 849 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1887) (divorce action).
11. "Unliquidated damages are such as rest in opinion only, and which cannot be
ascertained by computation or calculation.'' Litsinger v. Ross, l!i5 M:d •,;4, 157, 44 A,2d
435, 436 (1945).
12. In some kinds of actions applicable law prohibits an award of punitive damages •
under any circumstances. In such situations a demand for exemplary damages can be
discounted completely as legally impossible of fulfillment. See, e.g., Deming v. Buckley's
Art Gallery, 196 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Ark. 1961) (punitive damages not recoverable in
breach of contract action); Kantor v. Comet Pres$ Books Corp., 187 F. Supp. 821
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (punitive damages not recoverable for "fraud arising out of publishing
contract''); Newcastle Prods., Inc. v. School Dist. of Blair Township, 18 F. Supp. 835
(W.D. Pa. 1936) (punitive damages not recoverable from municipal corporation).
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a claimant's good faith that leads to the lack of uniformity in the
methods employed in determining the question of sincerity and
also, no doubt, to the inconsistency in the results reached. For example, in Harris v. Pasquotank County, 13 where the defendant
challenged the validity of the plaintiff's allegation that the amount
in controversy in a breach of contract action met the jurisdictional
minimum, the court held that the latter's affidavit asserting his honest
belief that he was entitled to more than ten thousand dollars damages
was sufficient by itself to satisfy the good faith requirement. The
court in Gordon v. Daigle, 14 on the other hand, was unwilling to rely
only upon the claimants' affidavits. It conducted a pre-trial hearing
and received evidence on such matters as the length of time during
which the plaintiffs were unable to work and the nature of their
disabilities before deciding that each claimant lacked good faith in
seeking damages in excess of ten thousand dollars for whiplash
injuries suffered in an automobile accident.
· Courts have shown a similar lack of uniformity in applying the
"legal certainty" aspect of the St. Paul rule.· Wade v. Rogala15 exemplifies one approach. Plaintiff sued under the Jones Act16 as the
administratrix of the estate of a seaman whose death was allegedly
attributable to defendant's negligence, which was said to have resulted in the sinking of the vessel on which the decedent had been
working. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
there was no justification for the lower court's method of determining before trial that plaintiff could not produce sufficient evidence
to support a verdict in excess of the jurisdictional minimum or that
such a verdict, if rendered, would have to be set aside as a matter
of law. Although it apparently approved of a judge's looking at
some evidence before trial in an effort to test the validity of a
claimant's allegation regarding the amount in controversy, the court
felt that where "the issue of jurisdictional amount ... is so closely
tied to the merits of the cause ... ," 17 the court should not insist
upon the pre-trial production of so much evidence that "under the
guise of determining jurisdiction, the merits of the controversy
[are] .. _summarily decided ... .''18 The court in Anthony v. United
Ins. Co. of America,19 however, took a different position on the issue
of pre-trial examination of the amount in controversy. Defendant's
agent had sold a thousand-dollar life insurance policy to the insured

____< \ _ I ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

227 F. Supp. 625 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
230 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. La. 1964).
270 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1959).
41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1959).
Ibid.; accord, Diana v. Canada Dry Corp., 189 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Pa. 1960); see
Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886).
19. 240 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.s.c. 1965).
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on the basis of misrepresentations to her that she was an acceptable
risk despite her bad health. After her death, defendant maintained
that it was not bound by its agent's statements and that it was therefore not obligated on the policy. The beneficiary sued to recover
fifty thousand dollars actual and punitive damages in reliance upon
state law, which would have permitted an award of exemplary
damages. Dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction, the
court, apparently unconcerned about looking at all the facts tending
to support the plaintiff's recovery, held that "under, the facts in this
case" a jury verdict in excess of ten thousand dollars would not be
permitted to stand as a matter of law.
When a court, after reviewing evidence introduced to substantiate the validity of an allegation that a claim can support an
award of more than ten thousand dollars, rules that recovery in
excess of this figure is impossible, it could be influenced by two
fundamentally different considerations. On the one hand, it might
simply feel that no jury would return a verdict larger than the
jurisdictional minimum on the basis of the claimant's evidence. In
such a case, the court would be resting its decision on a factual deter,mination rather than a legal certainty. In attempting to evaluate
the evidence as it assumed a jury would, rather than attempting to
determine the maximum permissible verdict a jury could reach,
the court would have misconceived the relationship between judge
and jury, since it is not the judge's responsibility to decide what a
jury will do. 20 On the other hand, the court might believe that if a
jury returned a verdict in excess of the jurisdictional minimum on
the basis of the evidence, the result could not be allowed to stand.21
Here the St. Paul rule is properly applied, and the fear expressed in
Wade that an extensive examination of a claimant's evidence would
impinge upon the jury's role is not well founded, for the court has
sought to determine the largest recovery which the evidence can
support as a matter of law, rather than the size of the award to which
it will actually lead. 22 Indeed, it would seem that the only fair way
for a court to determine the largest amount to which a claimant
could legally be entitled is to consider all his evidence on the damage
issue.
·
As noted above, Congress established the jurisdictional minimum
20. Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632, 645-46 (1907); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550,
565 (1886).
21. See Turner v. Wilson Line, 242 F.2d 414, 419 (1st Cir. 1957); Anthony v. United
Ins. Co. of America, 240 F. Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.S.C. 1965). But see Bell v. Preferred Life
Assur. Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 243 (1943).
22. "The controlling distinction between the power of the court and that of the
jury is that the former is the power to determine the law and the latter to determine
the facts." Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935); accord, Hickman v. Jones, 76
U.S. (9 Wall.) 197, 201 (1869); Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall,) 1, 4 (1794).
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in an effort to reduce the caseload of the federal courts. However,
no rules were provided by which a court can determine whether
the proper amount is actually in controversy in a given case.23 In
St. Paul the Supreme Court attempted to correct this deficiency by
holding that a claimant's allegation respecting the value of the right
which he seeks to assert should control if the "good faith" and "legal
certainty" criteria are satisfied, but it has never defined the standards by which these tests are to be applied. No standard is actually
needed for the application of the "good faith" aspect of the St. Paul
rule, because that criterion has little significance without reference
to the amount legally recoverable. If it is legally certain that recovery in excess of the jurisdictional minimum is impossible, the claimant's good faith belief that he is entitled to more than ten thousand
dollars is irrelevant.24 Conversely, if there is no such legal certainty,
it is unlikely that bad faith would be found 1vhen a claimant has a
legal right to recover the amount sought. 25 In failing to lay down
standards for determining which recoveries are legally impossible,
the Court no doubt assumed that judges would use the same guidelines which they regularly employ in setting aside excessive verdicts
and in ordering remittiturs--other situations in which it is crucial
to determine the maximum amount of a legally permissible verdict.
In unliquidated damage suits, courts generally allow a jury· award
to stand unmodified unless it is "grossly excessive,"26 "flagrantly
outrageous and extravagant,"27 or "so high as to shock the conscience."28 However, these standards obviously provide no basis for
23. The only legislation dealing specifically with the determination of the amount
in controversy is 28 U.S.C. § 2108 (1964): "Where the power of any court of appeals to
review a case depends upon the amount or value in controversy, such amount or value,
if not otherwise satisfactorily disclosed upon the record, may be shown and ascertained
by the oath of a party to the case or by other competent evidence." This legislation
appears to have been enacted during the period when a particular amount in controversy was a prerequisite to appeal to a federal court of appeals from certain territorial courts. Its value today is doubtful. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-92 (1964). Even accepting
§ 2108 as an indication of congressional feeling on the question of methods to be
employed in determining the amount in controversy, it provides no clearer guidelines
than those currently in use in the district courts.
24. See McDonald v. Patton, 240 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1957).
25. But see Brown v. Bodak, 188 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking $8,500 damages for personal injuries at a time when the jurisdictional
minimum was only $3,000. The jurisdictional minimum was raised to $10,000 before
trial, however, and the court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. Thereupon
plaintiff amended to claim $10,500 but alleged no additional elements of damage. The
court felt that the amendment was colored, for the purpose of attempting to establish
federal jurisdiction. Without determining whether a recovery in excess of $10,000 would
have been legally permissible, the court dismissed the action because of plaintiff's bad
faith in alleging the amount in controversy.
26. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Morris, 260 F.2d 594, 506 (6th Cir. 1958).
27. Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., 339 F.2d 64, 65 (6th Cir. 1964).
28. Denny v. Montour R.R., 101 F. Supp. 735, 743 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
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anything approaching an objective determination and must be
partly responsible for the inconsistency in the results achieved in
applying the jurisdictional limitations.29
It is probably impossible to formulate objective guidelines for
determining whether the ten thousand dollar minimum is present
in a particular action for unliquidated damages, so long as the St.
Paul rule remains law.30 Therefore, any attempt to create a greater
degree of consistency in the results of hearings on the jurisdictional
issue in the course of such suits must come from a more uniform
method for employing the St. Paul tests when a pre-trial attack is
made upon a claimant's jurisdictional-amount allegation. Any procedure adopted should be predicated upon three considerations.
First, since a claimant's sincerity cannot be determined without
reference to the amount which he can legally recover, an independent examination into his good faith is generally futile. 81 Second, a
court cannot with fairness dismiss a claimant's action on the ground
of lack of the requisite amount in controversy without taking account of all his evidence bearing on the damage issue. Third, in
deference to Congress' desire to expedite the conduct of business
in the federal courts, these tribunals must strive to consider this
evidence with all reasonable dispatch.32
One approach would be to allow a claimant of unliquidated
damages whose allegation of the amount in controversy has been
challenged to file an affidavit with the court specifying with par29. Compare Jenkins v. Fandal, 242 F. Supp. 528 (W.D. Pa. 1965), with Mintz v.
DeBiase, 236 F. Supp. 654 (D. Mass. 1964). In the former case plaintiff claimed damages
for pain, suffering, inconvenience and loss of future earnings on account of back in•
juries alleged to have been sustained in an automobile accident resulting from defen•
dant's negligence. Although plaintiff maintained that she had experienced discomfort
immediately after the accident, she waited three weeks to consult a physician. She produced little evidence to show that the mishap had diminished her earning power.
Eventually the jury awarded her only $2,000. Although the court recognized that the
validity of an allegation of the amount in controversy can be made at any time, it denied
a post-trial motion to dismiss her complaint, holding that the complaint did not clearly
lack a valid allegation of jurisdictional amount. In the latter case plaintiff sought com•
pensation for pain, suffering, ·shock, sickness, and continuing discomfort from injuries
said to have been sustained when she was thrown from defendant's horse. The court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim which could be valued at $10,000 or
more, despite the fact that the plaintiff had been hospitalized for three weeks, in casts
and incapacitated for two months, in braces for an additional six weeks, and allegedly
suffered continued pain and discomfort.
30. While St. Paul is generally recognized as the leading decision dealing with the
interpretation of the jurisdictional amount provisions in the Judicial Code, it must be
noted that the case appears to have involved a claim for liquidated damages-the outof-pocket expenses incurred because of defendant insurer's alleged breach of contract in
denying liability upon certain workmen's compensation claims asserted against plaintiff
employer. Since St. Paul did not expressly address itself to the special problems involved
in determining the amount in controversy in suits for unliquidated damages, doubt
has been cast upon the need to consider it binding in this area. See Barry v. Edmunds,
116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886).
31. See text accompanying notes 22 8: 23 supra.
32. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
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ticularity the nature of the injuries he has allegedly sustained and
the evidence upon which he will rely to prove his damages. The court
could examine this affidavit alone, without considering the actual
evidence, in much the same manner as it would deal with the affidavits and depositions filed in connection with a motion for summary judgment. Upon the basis of the sworn allegations it could
apply what legal certainty standards there are to determine whether
a claimant could legally recover more than ten thousand dollars.
The time and the expense necessary to pr-0duce the actual evidence
bearing on the damage issue would thus be saved, and the claimant
would be afforded an opportunity to state his entire case in favor of
the court's taking jurisdiction of his cause of action.
If a court should find during the course of trial that the statements in a claimant's affidavit were exaggerated, it could invoke the
sanction provided by Congress in the 1958 amendments to the Judicial Code. These provisions authorize courts to deny costs to a claimant, or to assess costs against him, if he ultimately recovers less than
ten thousand dollars .in any action in which federal jurisdiction has
been predicated upon an amount in controversy in excess of that
figure. 83 Indeed, these amendments suggest that Congress foresaw
cases in which a court could not confidently decide before trial
whether there was an appropriate amount in controversy and that it
approved a court's taking jurisdiction Jn such cases.84 Moreover, since
this legislation was designed to deter the filing of "inflated" claims it
was not necessarily intended to be applied in every case in which
less than ten thousand dollars is recovered, despite the claimant's·
good faith in asking for more than ten thousand dollars.85 The threat
33. 28 U.S.C. § 133l(b) (1964) provides in reference to claims arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States: "Except when express provision therefor
is otherwise made in a statute of the United States, where the plaintiff is finally ad•
judged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $10,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim tci which the defendant may be adjudged to
be entitled, and exclusive of interests and costs, the district court may deny costs to the
plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff."
28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1964), dealing with suits brought in federal courts because of
the diverse citizenship of the parties, contains language virtually identical to that of
§ 133l(b), but applies only to "the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal
courts ••••" It appears that these words were omitted from § 1331(b) through oversight. See 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 1291 n.31 (1958).
34. Lutz v. McNair, 233 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Va. 1964).
35. The claimant who acted in good faith in demanding more than $10,000 need
not fear the costs provisions, since a court is not required to assess costs, even though
ultimate recovery is less than that amount. Stachon v. Hoxie, 190 F. Supp. 185 (W.D.
Mich. 1960); see S. REP. No. 1830, op. cit. supra note I, at 5.
·
It has been argued that the continued application of the good-faith test in determining the validity of a claimant's allegation of the amount in controversy would render
the costs provisions virtually meaningless, since a claim found to be in bad faith is
likely to be dismissed, and, where it is not dismissed, it seems difficult to say that a
court can find a claimant in good faith for the purpose of taking jurisdiction but in
bad faith for the purpose of applying the costs provisions, where the same test of good
faith is involved in both determinations. Foster, Congress Changes Jurisdiction of
United States District Courts, Wis. B. Bull., August 1958, p. 73; Comment, 58 CoLUM.
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of these costs provisions--or, if Congress so desires, more serious
penalties38-should make a claimant consider the contents of his
affidavit carefully. Not to be overlooked in this regard is the possibility of a contempt citation when a claimant can be shown to have
falsified his affidavit.37
Since the final determination of the amount in controversy
would rest in the judge's subjective evaluation of the claimant's
affidavit considered against the background of the imperfect standards currently available for applying the St. Paul test, the above
proposal will not serve as a panacea for the difficulty involved in
an attempt to determine accurately the value of the rights in controversy in unliquidated damage actions. Nevertheless, the establishment of a uniform method for dealing with the problem will
increase the likelihood of achieving consistency and predictability
in the results of pretrial hearings on this jurisdictional question. A
court's adoption of the proposal would serve to implement the congressional policy of limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts and
thereby expediting the conduct of their business, and at the same
time would give the claimant a better opportunity than he has
at present in some courts to indicate in detail the nature of all
his evidence relating to the amount put into controversy by his
complaint.

L REv. 1287, 1291-94 (1958); Note, 45 MARQ. L. REv. 117, 119 (1961); see Stachon v.
Hoxie, supra. See generally Cowen, Federal Jurisdiction Amended, 44 VA. L REV, 9'11,
975-78 (1958).
36. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DlVISION OF JURISDicrION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 49 (I'cnt. Draft No. I, 1963), where it was suggested that the deterrent value
of the costs provisions could be enhanced if a court were permitted to tax against a
party who filed an inflated claim the amount of his opponent's reasonable expenses
and attorney's fees attributable to the conduct of his defense. Similar assessments arc
currently permissible against a party who has abused the federal pretrial discovery
procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d), 37(a), 37(c). The proposal docs not appear among
the American Law Institute's final recommendations dealing with the diversity juris•
diction of federal courts. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 64-65 (Official Draft 1965).
37. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g), which provides for contempt penalties when a
party files in bad faith a motion for summary judgment.

